

URBAN GROWTH IN THE SOUTH: GENERAL PATTERNS *

BY ZANE L. MILLER

As we enter the 1980s, civic leaders in cities across the South and indeed the entire nation are taking stock of the urban policies of the last twenty years, and much of that stock-taking centers on the issue of growth, or its absence. This reappraisal has been encouraged by the fact that 1980 was a decennial federal census year, the time we tally the latest results in the urban sweepstakes. The preliminary results stunned big city leaders in both frostbelt and sunbelt towns. Baltimore and Philadelphia lost 18 percent in population in the preliminary count, and Wilmington, North Carolina, 15.9 percent. Washington, D.C.'s population plummeted 25 percent, Kansas City dropped 15 percent, and St. Louis, which is rapidly becoming a chief symbol of our sick cities, suffered a shocking 13.7 percent population loss in a decade. Chicago's population fell by 644,000 persons, and more surprisingly, 107 Chicago suburbs and the Chicago metropolitan area generally lost population, the latter for the first time in its history. Around Washington and the close-in Virginia suburbs of Arlington and Alexandria lost 13 and 9 percent of their population respectively. Even Los Angeles, once the national symbol of sunbelt urban growth, recorded what was for it a minuscule increase of 2.9 percent. These results have been most depressing for big city mayors, who, as Atlanta's Maynard Jackson put it, felt "knocked down, dragged, fed up and disgusted" by the early counts which struck them as not merely unbelievable but outrageous. The reasons for their ire, of course, are obvious. As Jackson told a congressional hearing on the issue: "There are two itty-bitty little things at stake here — money and votes," a reference to the fear among big cities about the loss of federal funding and a diminished representa-

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tion in Congress and the state legislatures as a consequence of population declines.¹

These figures seem to suggest, as some students of urban growth have argued, that our central cities are indeed fated to become the empty hole in the metropolitan doughnut. But as Neil R. Peirce, a perceptive journalist who specializes in state and local government affairs, noted, the news for the central cities from the census bureau was not all bad. He pointed out that many cities which had lost population registered gains in the number of urban households, and that even in sunbelt cities which gained in population, the rate of household formations outstripped those gains. What this meant was that central cities had become the special haven of young single people, newly married people, the divorced, and young and older people living with "companions," roommates or partners, and of the elderly living alone. And by 1990, according to the report from the MIT-Harvard Joint Center for Urban Studies, only 50 percent of households will be headed by married couples — compared to 80 percent in 1950. In 1990, as the report put it: "No one type of household will be 'typical': The nuclear family consisting of mom, dad, and the kids will no longer hold sway as it once did."²

One may, like the big city mayors, dispute the preliminary census findings on urban population growth, and one may disagree with the configuration and consequences of the kind of households projected for 1990 by the MIT-Harvard Joint Center for Urban Studies. But to a historian, and perhaps to others as well, what was striking about these recent discussions of population growth, no growth, and the increase in the rate of household formation in cities was the absence of references to southern cities as a peculiar variety of the American species, and to the South as either laggard, leading, or pursuing a distinctive course in these most recent processes of urbanization.

That is striking because until very recently conventional wisdom has held that the South has been peculiar historically because it was rural; that it has had very few cities of any significance, and that the few it did have lagged far behind the East and the North in urbanization and constituted different kinds of cities. And those "facts" formed much of the foundation for the hallowed argument that the South comprised a distinctive region with a distinctive history and culture if not a distinctive civilization.³ According to this view of the South's

¹ *Chicago Tribune*, August 31, 1980, Section 1, p. 10; *Cincinnati Post*, September 9, 1980, 5A. Also see *The New York Times*, July 7, 1980, A1 and B7, for a ranking of cities from most depressed to least depressed on the basis of economic indicators from the 1970s.

² *Cincinnati Post*, September 9, 1980, 5A.

³ See Rupert B. Vance and Nicholas Demerath, eds., *The Urban South* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1954), and George B. Tindall, *The Emergence of the New South, 1913-1945* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), Ch. XVII.

urban past, the region did not even try to foster city growth until about 1870, when a group of New South spokesmen launched a fifty year campaign to industrialize and urbanize Dixie, an effort which produced what C. Vann Woodward once characterized as an industrial and urban evolution rather than an industrial and urban revolution.⁴ According to this same conventional wisdom, the South led by the new agrarians turned its back on the materialistic values of urban and industrial America in the 1920s and 1930s, only to emerge from its torpor after World War II when defense spending and the rise of so-called footloose industries made it possible for the entire southern and western rim of the continent to emerge as the region of the most dynamic metropolitan growth. Incidentally, this same area came to be known as the bulwark of the new conservatism from which the Goldwaters, Nixons, and Reagans would build an era of national ascendancy for a revitalized Republican Party cut loose from its former dependence upon the decadent, declining, and urban dominated region known derisively as the home of the snowbirds or as the region of the frostbelt.⁵

It is beyond the scope of this essay to challenge the political aspect of the conventional account of the past pattern of urban growth in the South. But it is possible to compose an alternative version of other parts of the story. This version of the story concedes that the history of southern cities and of urbanization in the South differs in detail from that in other areas of the country, but it also suggests that the pattern of urban growth and how it was done as a matter of general strategy was not so distinctive after all.

Throughout our colonial history, for example, seacoast cities dominated the economic, social, political, intellectual, and artistic life of the various colonies. If one is willing to include the Spanish and French holdings in North America as part of our colonial past, one will note that Florida had cities before New England. Other seacoast cities sprang up in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the South as in New England and the Middle Atlantic States proceeded by the establishment of an urban frontier from which the wild countryside was transformed and its native inhabitants either "civilized" or removed. These southern seacoast cities — places like Norfolk, Wilmington, Savannah, Charleston, Pensacola, and New Orleans — like the other colonial seacoast cities, also functioned as hinges, gathering people, ideas, and goods from abroad and shipping them to

⁴ C. Vann Woodward, *Origins of the New South, 1877-1913* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951).

⁵ David C. Perry and Alfred J. Watkins, eds., *The Rise of the Sunbelt Cities* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977); David R. Goldfield and Blaine A. Brownell, *Urban America: From Downtown to No Town* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1974), Ch. 14.

the interior, and gathering people, ideas, and goods from the interior and shipping them abroad. Nor were these early southern cities insignificant. During the eighteenth century, as Carl Bridenbaugh has observed, Charleston ranked as one of the English colonies' five wealthiest and most urbane cities,⁶ and early in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, when Chicago was little more than a fort in a swamp, New Orleans threatened to outstrip New York in the volume of trade it handled. Indeed, during the early nineteenth century the South urbanized at a rate unmatched in the Western world except by England and the North.

So from the beginning of European and American encroachment on this continent the South had cities, and they multiplied and grew at an impressive rate. That process proceeded through the middle decades of the nineteenth century, and in the South, as elsewhere, it stemmed not merely from the influence of economic, social, technological, or geographic forces, but also from the efforts of city boosters who supported policies and projects to make their cities more attractive and prosperous and to expand the reach of their influence. In Charleston, for example, a group of fire-eaters championed secession not only as the path of salvation for the South but also as a means by which Charleston could break free from what its leaders saw as the stultifying economic dominance of New York City. And J.B.D. DeBow, an indefatigable booster of New Orleans' fortunes, also saw the sectional conflict in urban terms. As he put it in the 1840s,

a contest has been going on between the North and South, not limited to slavery or no slavery — to abolition or no abolition, nor to the policies of either Whigs or Democrats, as such, but a contest for the wealth and commerce of the great valley of the Mississippi — a battle for no principle of government, no right of human freedom in the abstract, but a contest tendered by our Northern brethren, whether the growing commerce of the Great West, shall be thrown upon New Orleans or given to the Atlantic cities — which shall receive, store, sell and ship the immense products of that country lying between the Appalachian and Rocky Mountains.⁷

⁶Carl Bridenbaugh, *Cities in Revolt: Urban Life in America, 1743-1776* (New York: Knopf, 1964); Howard P. Chudacoff, *The Evolution of American Urban Society* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1981), Ch. 1.

⁷Quoted in Richard C. Wade, "The City in History—Some American Perspectives," in Werner Z. Mirsch, ed., *Urban Life and Form* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963).

Ultimately, New Orleans lost that contest as Chicago, aided by federal legislation and eastern and foreign investors, captured crucial rail links both to the east and the west, thus deflecting the flow of commerce exclusively down the Mississippi via St. Louis to New Orleans. But that did not end the efforts of southern civic leaders, like those elsewhere, to secure state and federal assistance for harbor and wharf improvements and for railway construction, one notable episode of which involved the great compromise over the contested presidential election of 1876 by which the South was supposed to receive federal aid on several port improvement and railway building schemes.⁸

Mid-nineteenth century southern city boosters, like those elsewhere, did not restrict their efforts to transportation schemes, however, and did not rely solely on state or federal assistance. In these years southern civic leaders participated in the transformation of municipal government into an active agency to defend and advance the public interest. Southern and northern cities abandoned volunteer fire and police forces in favor of a full-time paid municipal force. They gave up on Boards of Health which acted only during epidemics or the threat of epidemics in favor of full-time paid municipal departments of health which systematically policed the sanitary state of the cities. Both southern and northern cities began to build citywide gas, water and sewer systems, city parks, and horse-drawn railways. Attempts were made as well to improve the common schools. Civic leaders across the nation built up mechanics institutes, academies, medical and law colleges, and held mechanics expositions and commercial conventions. These cities in the mid-nineteenth century engaged in annexations and consolidation movements which broadened the municipal political arena and generally, but particularly in New Orleans, helped enliven urban politics. And southern leaders, like those elsewhere, encouraged manufacturing, constructed opulent hotels, created mercantile associations, and compiled city directories as a means of rationalizing urban life.⁹

In this view, then, southern urban history during the mid-nineteenth century does not look so different from that elsewhere in the country. And additional evidence could be marshaled. As Richard C. Wade and Howard Rabinowitz have argued,¹⁰ Jim Crow replaced slav-

⁸On the compromise of the 1876 presidential election see C. Vann Woodward, *Reunion and Reaction* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1951).

⁹This paragraph and much that follows draws on the essays in Blaine A. Brownell and David R. Goldfield, eds., *The City in Southern History* (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1977). On city government in the mid-nineteenth century, however, see also Alan I. Marcus, "In Sickness and in Health . . ." (Ph.D. diss., University of Cincinnati, 1979), and Marcus, "The Strange Career of Municipal Health Initiatives: Cincinnati and City Government in the Early Nineteenth Century," *Journal of Urban History*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (November 1980), pp. 3-29.

¹⁰Richard C. Wade, *Slavery in the Cities* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964); Howard N. Rabinowitz, *Race Relations in the Urban South, 1865-1890* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).

ery as the institutional mechanism governing race relations in southern cities during those years, just as institutional segregation persisted as a pervasive force in most northern cities. German and Irish immigrants came to southern cities, too, and nativist-immigrant conflicts disrupted urban politics below as well as above the Mason-Dixon line. Indeed, a good case can be made that urban land use patterns were similar in cities above and below the Ohio River, for in the cities of Dixie in the mid-nineteenth century, as in other American cities, the wealthy and well-born tended to live near the emerging central business districts while the poor, the greenest immigrants, and blacks tended to huddle on the urban periphery amidst grogshops, tenements, railway terminals, and manufacturing and commercial facilities. Farther out, on the cool green rim of the city, urban elites built first suburban summer cottages then mansions, and civic leaders created new cemeteries and parks and established institutions in parklike settings for correcting the behaviour of those deemed deviant by society.

Something happened after 1870, however, which made the South and southern cities themselves seem deviant. The discourse about the South after 1870 centered not only on the legitimacy of the existence within America of a peculiar institution, such as slavery or the plantation, but on the South conceived in a new way, as a cultural region somehow deviant from what was coming to be seen as normal for the American nation. As Henry D. Shapiro has put it, about 1870 "new notions about the nature of America and American civilization . . . gained currency . . . (namely) that America was, was becoming, or ought to become a unified and homogeneous national entity, and that what characterized such an entity was a coherent and uniform national culture."¹¹

In this context "the South" came to be seen as a problem, and most diagnoses — southern and northern alike — contended that it comprised a problem because it was not "modern." The specifics in the charge varied. Some said the South had too few schools, or too few roads and railroads. Others claimed that it lacked sufficient sanitary and public health facilities. Still others argued that it had too many blacks. But many synthesizers of these various positions contended that what the South lacked was great industrial-urban centers to tap and develop the resources of the region to produce the prosperity necessary for the modernization of the region. For them the South was not yet, but was or was capable of becoming, a new South which would

¹¹Henry D. Shapiro, *Appalachia on Our Mind* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978), p. xi.

form a part of the American nation conceived as a unified and homogeneous national entity.¹²

The analysis of the South as a problem because of its urban backwardness and peculiarity persisted into the twentieth century, and it sparked a variety of projects to bring the South into conformity with the new conception of the American norm of modernity. Among other things, it suggested the appropriateness of industrializing older cities on the periphery of the region and of projects to exploit the mineral resources and labor of the interior South. Philanthropists, journalists, scientists, educators, capitalists, and speculators joined in these projects, and while their efforts may not have produced an industrial revolution, they brought a significant change in the southern pattern of urbanization, namely the rapid growth of cities and mill, coal, and railway towns in the interior of Dixie.

We often forget, moreover, that some of these interior places were quintessentially modern, as that word was then understood. Atlanta comes to mind, of course, but a good case can be made for the proposition that Birmingham was, as indeed it came to be known, the "Magic City" of this new South.

Merely a gleam in the eyes of iron, railroad and real estate speculators in the 1870s, it had by the turn of the century a diverse economic base and ranked as a strong challenger to Atlanta's claim on supremacy in the Southeast. By that time, too, it possessed a more diverse white ethnic contingent than most southern cities, as well as burgeoning black ghettos which contained about one third of the total population. As in other places North and South, moreover, people, industry, and business spilled across the original municipal boundaries, creating the basis for city — suburban conflict and setting the stage for the great annexation drive of 1910 which yielded 'Greater Birmingham,' a sprawling municipality described by one modest booster as the 'Magic City of the World, the marvel of the South, the miracle of the Continent, the dream of the Hemisphere, the vision of all Mankind.' And like other places, rapid urban growth com-

¹²"Give us your sons as hostages," said Henry D. Grady in 1889 during a request for northern capital and men. "When you plant your capital in the millions, send your sons that they may help know how true are our hearts and may help to swell the Anglo-Saxon current until it can carry without danger this black infusion." Quoted in Thomas F. Gossett, *Race: The History of an Idea in America* (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1963), pp. 264-265. See also Zane L. Miller, "The Rise of the City," *Hayes Historical Journal* (forthcoming), and Miller, "Urban Blacks in the South . . ." in Leo F. Schnore, ed., *The New Urban History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 184-185.

bined with technological and scientific innovations set off a sustained demand for improved and new municipal services which broadened the scope of local government. To a larger extent than many might imagine, the history of Birmingham is the history of any late nineteenth and early twentieth century American metropolis.¹³

In these late nineteenth and early twentieth century years, southerners not only shared with northerners the view of cities as epitomizing modernity but also conceived of them as entities that were, were becoming, or ought to be basic units of society and comprised of discrete, interdependent and hierarchically organized parts and places, each with its own nature and function. In that context, civic and political leaders took as their fundamental task the problems of arranging the parts and places in the proper way and of seeing that each part and place performed its particular function most efficiently. Cities therefore were seen to have problems, without themselves being problematic.

This view of cities had profound consequences for urban growth. It suggested, for example, the appropriateness of systematically arranging land use patterns into commercial, industrial, and residential categories and of sorting out the urban population spatially by income, ethnicity and race, a policy requiring the deconcentration of urban areas by the adaptation of existing technology into various forms of mass rapid transit, including cable cars, electric trolleys, and finally the auto, bus, and truck. That policy produced a new urban form, which located the poor and greenest immigrants in central city slums and most blacks in central city ghettos, the more affluent in segregated suburbs, and the middling classes in what some called the "zone of emergence" between the slums and suburbs. This view of the city also suggested the appropriateness of centralizing planning and zoning to coordinate the functioning of urban parts and places and the reorganization of municipal governments into centralized and departmentalized bureaucracies headed by civil service or otherwise certified experts and led at the top by a city boss, strong mayor, small commission, or a city manager.

In this period too, then, the view of the nature of cities and the patterns and processes of urban growth and government in the South paralleled those found elsewhere in the country. After about 1915,

¹³Quoted in Carl V. Harris, *Political Power in Birmingham, 1871-1921* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1977), p. vii.

however, that began to change, as solutions to urban problems generally failed to produce the expected results, including the emergence of a thriving industrial-urban order in the South. What happened was that the continuing dissonance between what was and what ought to be led those engaged in the discourse about southern and northern cities to redefine what their idea ought to be. In short, the conception of America as unified and homogeneous was replaced by a vision of America as an entity that ought to be, was, or was becoming culturally pluralistic, a vision which set off attempts to define and realize a peculiarly southern culture and regionalism and therefore to define and realize a peculiarly southern urbanism and pattern of urbanization legitimately different from those of the East, Midwest, and West.

The notion of the South as a pluralistic cultural area defined the region and its cities as composed of subcultures and parts so interdependent that change in one produced change in the others and the entire system. The new notion also held that the South was a problem because it was poor, and that it was poor in part because it suffered from a time lag, such that the South in the 1920s and 1930s occupied a position reached by the North in the mid-nineteenth century. This view suggested the wisdom of various policies to stimulate southern development in ways producing a variety of cities rather than merely industrial ones. Southern cities now seemed ideal spots in which to conduct spring training for major league baseball, if not major league baseball itself. They also offered ideal materials, including Porgy and Bess and jazz, which came to be seen in this period as America's only indigenous art form, for enriching classical music, if not ideal locales for major league opera companies and symphonic orchestras. The South also seemed an ideal location for textile manufacturing and for the construction of federal highways, such as the one linking Detroit to Atlanta and Miami, not only to make its cities more accessible to business or to tourists seeking to taste the variety of southern life but also for defense purposes to tie together new military installations. And the new view also suggested the wisdom of system-wide planning and policies, such as the New Deal's agricultural, resettlement, and TVA programs to combat unemployment and persisting pockets of poverty in the area's most backward regions, and metropolitan rather than merely city planning.

One consequence of these various events was a small boom in southern urban growth and a shift in the pattern of urbanization. Between 1920 and 1940, according to Professor George Tindall, the South's economy "took off" as its rate of metropolitan growth exceeded the national average by 50 percent and as the list of southern cities among the nation's largest doubled from seven to fourteen. Not every place benefited equally, however, for south Florida, especially Miami, the piedmont, the Gulf Coast from Pensacola to New Orleans, Houston and Dallas in Texas, and the TVA region in Alabama and Tennessee showed the most dramatic changes and gains.

The view of the South as a distinctive region persisted into the last half of the twentieth century, but the content of the notion changed. After about 1950 a new view of American pluralism and the South took

hold. It posited individuals and individual localities and institutions rather than cultural regions and metropolitan communities as basic units of society, and attributed to each the autonomy to become what each decided to become and to each some responsibility for the public or civic welfare as opposed to the particular interest of each. Morris Janowitz has called this period the era of the community of limited liability, by which he meant that individual units of society seemed free from old determinisms. Thus business corporations considering their locational needs no longer thought in terms of the necessity to be close to raw materials and large pools of semiskilled and skilled labor, but in terms of using technologies to make industry footloose, free to move to any location with amenities to attract the research, development and communications experts vital to what people began to call a postindustrial economy. And thus, too, city planners and civic leaders started not with the assumption of metropolitan regional community but with the assumption that "the city" consisted of various neighborhoods, of heterogeneity, tension, and pace, and "suburbia" of various neighborhoods, of homogeneity, serenity, and relaxation.¹⁴

All of us are familiar with at least some of the consequences of this new view. They include, for example, a national competition among cities for high culture and research institutions, for Disneylands, for Hyatt-Regency hotels and convention centers, for historic sites and districts, for big city league sports teams, and for "urban" universities with a research faculty strong in the sciences, social and economic policy, as well as management and marketing analysis. They also include a national competition among cities for airports and airline connections, and for federal dollars to fund expressways, urban renewal, neighborhood planning, and downtown revitalization projects which the concept of "the city" and "suburbia" suggested. More specifically, the consequences of the new view include the emergence of the rim of the continent as the area of most dynamic urban growth, the move of the Dodgers from Brooklyn to Chavez Ravine, and the rise of the Atlanta airport, the Houston Astros, Oilers, and Cougars, the Dallas Cowboys and Miami Dolphins, and the Research Triangle and National Humanities Center in the Duke University and University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill area.

Our recent past, in short, contains good news for progrowth elements in the South. But the period of the community of limited liability may well have ended. I first began to think so in the early 1970s when I sought to discover the meaning of the new word "metroplex." In Dallas someone told me it first referred to the area from which the new airport would draw outbound passengers, and that it gradually dislodged

¹⁴Morris Janowitz, *The Community Press in an Urban Setting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967). For an elaboration of the consequences of the notion of community of limited liability, see Zane L. Miller, *Suburb: Neighborhood and Community in Forest Park, Ohio, 1935-1976* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1981).

metropolis as the word designating the Dallas-Ft. Worth urban area. Next a physician in New Orleans told me that metroplex identified an area for the delivery to individuals of health care services, and observed that it did not coincide with either political jurisdictions or previous definitions of the social and economic entity known as the New Orleans metropolitan area. And then I learned that in Hamilton, Ohio, just north of Cincinnati, a radio station started in the early 1970s to say that it served the Cincinnati-Dayton metroplex, by which it meant an area containing the individuals who lived within reach of the station's signal.

What intrigued me about these definitions of metroplex was the absence of a civic or cultural connotation, their assumption that urban society consists of individuals liberated and turned inward in the pursuit of personal psychological, physical, and social and economic well-being. It strikes me too that proponents of the neighborhood organization movement since the early 1970s have defined their localities as noncivic places of inward turning individuals which need a share of local sovereignty not merely to participate in planning decisions but to assert local control in doing their own planning, zoning, and historic preservation, and in devising their own budgets in ways to advance individual interests rather than the public interest. And it also strikes me that the new terms sunbelt and frostbelt are defined in similar ways, not as civic or cultural entities but merely as settings for activities of individuals turned inward in the pursuit of the politics of personal advocacy, a politics which resorts increasingly not merely to Proposition 13s but to referenda of all kinds, independent voting, formation of single issue groups, and litigation, and less willingly, to compromise through the legislative process and political parties.

It is in my judgement this definition of urban society as a community of advocacy which constitutes one of our more pressing problems. It has produced a kind of political paralysis at all levels of government, fed a disinclination even to discuss the public welfare, and contributed to the budget crises confronting not only central city but also inner-suburban municipalities and inner-metropolitan counties. And it leads us to overlook some familiar and unresolved urban problems, including housing, health care and poverty, and most importantly the persistence of brown and black ghettos, which as the events in Miami during the summer of 1980 suggest, remain like time bombs ticking away at the heart of our metropolitan areas.¹⁵

Solutions to these issues will not be easy to find, but if this foray through Southern urban history suggests anything it suggests that we can do something about all of them. It suggests, that is, that we are not

¹⁵On the community of advocacy see Miller, *Suburb*.

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America: A Brief

"YOUR GENEROUS INVITATION": EVENTS PRECEDING THE APPEARANCE OF JOHN F. KENNEDY BEFORE THE GREATER HOUSTON MINISTERIAL ASSOCIATION

BY DEANE A. KEMPER

John Fitzgerald Kennedy, nearly twenty years after his death, remains the most identifiable Roman Catholic in the history of the United States. Throughout his political career, from his first election to the Congress in 1946 at the age of twenty-nine, until the solemn requiem mass that gripped the nation in November of 1963, Kennedy was known to his ever-expanding constituency as a communicant in the Church of Rome. As a congressman and later senator from Massachusetts, a state with a Roman Catholic population exceeding fifty percent, his faith was hardly a liability. His religion was, in fact, a significant asset on his running against the Eisenhower tide in 1952 and unseating Episcopalian Republican Henry Cabot Lodge.

A Roman Catholic running for national office was, however, a different matter. Conventional wisdom held that anti-Catholic prejudice in all sections of the country, but particularly in the South and Mid-West, would more than over balance Catholic bloc voting in the Northeast and industrial centers in the Great Lakes region. The defeat of the urban, Catholic, New York Governor Al Smith in 1928 by the western, Protestant, Herbert Hoover was confirmation of the thesis.

In 1959 and 1960 traditional political thinking concerning the influence of religious preference on voting behavior would be first challenged and then shattered. While there were significant events along the way, such as Fletcher Knebel's interview of Senator Kennedy in *Look* magazine in March of 1959, and the candidate's victory over Hubert Humphrey in the Democratic primary in Protestant West Virginia a year later, it was the appearance before the clergy of Houston on the evening of September 12, 1960, that defused issues emanating from Mr. Kennedy's faith for the remainder of the campaign.

constrained by historic or other kinds of determinisms, for our predecessors have been able to view their society in new ways and therefore to create new realities. So we should perhaps begin by asking ourselves if the community of advocacy is really the kind of society we want. If not, we could begin to formulate a new definition which will meet our needs, better describe the realities of our times as we now understand them. If so, we might ask whether we can arrange our institutions, communities, and policies so that they work more effectively and equitably than they have during that recent past in which we still live.

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