Joseph Jay Pastoriza and the
Single Tax in Houston, 1911-1917

Stephen Davis

On November 17, 1981, Kathryn J. Whitmire easily triumphed in Houston's runoff election and so became mayor of the nation's fourth city. A much-respected analyst of area politics termed this outcome a real departure, with Whitmire becoming Houston's 'first elected mayor with no establishment support.' This evaluation sadly ignores the experience of an important, if overlooked, political figure from the city's past. For in February 1917, Joseph Jay Pastoriza, despite fervent opposition from most of the city's leadership, won a bruising mayoral campaign that stirred and divided the city. The astonishing fact is that J. J. Pastoriza was not simply a municipal reformer of the Progressive period, but an admitted disciple of the renowned democratic radical, Henry George. During his 1911 to 1917 tenure as Tax Commissioner, he established the Houston Plan of Taxation, a scheme of property tax valuation directly inspired by George's ideal of the single tax. Despite the controversy his plan aroused, Pastoriza enjoyed enormous public support, as is evidenced by his margins of victory in four consecutive campaigns. How can this apparent departure from Houston's long-term tradition of conservative, elite-dominated politics be explained? What was the

Mayor J. J. Pastoriza in 1917.

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1Richard Murray quoted in Wade Roberts, "In Houston, it's 'Her Honor,'" Texas Observer 73 (December 4, 1981), 8.

basis of Pastoriza’s popular appeal over this span of years?

Joseph Jay Pastoriza’s early life exemplified the American dream of self-made success. Born in New Orleans on January 8, 1857, to parents recently immigrated from Barcelona, he became an orphan before the age of two. The infant, who had come to Houston with his father in 1858, was adopted by the Edward Daly family. Pastoriza’s foster father died at the Battle of Corinth in 1862. The youth managed to acquire an education at Fitzgerald’s Academy in Houston. At seventeen, he became an iron moulder’s apprentice, working ten-hour days, while studying shorthand and bookkeeping at night. In 1878, he became business manager of Houston’s daily newspaper, The Age. The next year, Pastoriza opened a printing and stationery business with a few hundred dollars he had saved. This firm, which eventually became the Pastoriza Printing and Lithographing Company in the 300 block of Main Street, prospered. Pastoriza also invested successfully in real estate, so that by the end of his life he had accumulated a modest fortune. In 1917, Pastoriza owned sixty-two vacant lots and six improved tracts in the city. This property was assessed at $49,940, placing its full value around $75,000. In 1906, Pastoriza retired at age forty-eight to devote the remainder of his life to public service. For four years, he traveled throughout the United States and Europe studying municipal reform. Several intellectual influences shaped his interest in public administration. Pastoriza once explained that he received his religion from Jesus, his judgment of human nature from Shakespeare, and his democratic principles from Lincoln and Jefferson. But most importantly, he had “learned to love my fellow man and get a greater idea of justice from reading the books written by that very great man, Henry George.” For J. J. Pastoriza, as for thousands of other reform-minded Americans in the late nineteenth century and the Progressive Era, Henry George (1839-1897) evoked tremendous admiration. George’s 1879 opus, Progress and Poverty, probably sold more copies than any other American work ever published on political economy. George, in a lyrical and persuasive prose style, exposed the material injustices of Gilded Age America and proposed a comprehensive remedy for the nation’s ills. This solution, the single tax, was a levy on land values designed to expropriate increases in property value that resulted strictly from economic growth and expanding population in the vicinity surrounding the holdings concerned. By collecting this “unearned increment,” the state simultaneously could break the power of parasitical land monopolists and finance prosperity and equality for the mass of society.

George wielded national and international influence for decades after his death. Individuals as varied as Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Leo Tolstoy, and David Lloyd George adopted his ideas. Throughout the United States, a single tax movement emerged to promote fiscal and social reform at local and state levels. The Houston Single Tax League formed in 1890 and sponsored weekly educational meetings. Pastoriza actively served this organization. In 1903, he built a log cabin at the corner of Cleburne and Caroline for a lot purchased for $500. To illustrate the need for the single tax, Pastoriza announced that he would improve this property no further and would sell only when the price reached $5,000. In the meantime, the Single Tax Log Cabin housed the Houston Single Tax League and hosted its forums. By 1911, Houston had grown around this location, and lots across the street sold for $4,750. Pastoriza, who gained much notoriety from the Log Cabin, thus dramatically showed how speculators pocketed unearned profits from the productivity of their neighbors. He also worked in the national Georgite movement, being a member of the single tax community of Fairhope, Alabama. Without doubt, Henry George’s political philosophy guided Pastoriza’s public career and inspired his policy ideas more than any other influence.

Pastoriza burst into Houston politics with an aggressive and brilliant campaign for city commissioner in the 1911 Democratic primary. Since commission candidates did not run for specific departmental offices, but were appointed to their posts by the mayor upon winning office, Pastoriza initially declined to raise primary issues or plans. Indeed, his solitary platform plank was to “work as faithfully for the city as I have in the past for myself.” Pastoriza instead touted his personal integrity and talents in this early stage of the race. In a newspaper ad headed “Why didn’t J. J. Pastoriza Enter Politics,” he articulated a characteristic Georgite belief that the people were best and most efficiently served by former businessmen who used elective office to advance the public interest. Pastoriza, after four years of post-retirement rest and travel, eagerly sought such a role. He displayed reform-minded sentiments in his pledge to be an open and accessible city official. In an appeal to labor

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3*Houston Post, February 10, 1911; Houston Chronicle, July 9, 15, 1917; Houston Press, July 9, 1917.


6*For example, see Leo Tolstoy, Resurrection (New York, 1929), 2. 16-17.

7*Houston City Directory, 1928-1929, 31; Houston Chronicle, February 28, March 1, 1911.

voters, he recalled his vigorous leadership in establishing a six o'clock closing for downtown businesses. In this way, he had shortened the workday for his employees, allowing them needed respite and time with their families. Pastoriza claimed that in twenty-eight years of business, he never suffered a strike or experienced contention over wages and hours.²⁶

As the campaign progressed, Pastoriza focused his criticism on Finance Commissioner John Z. Gaston. Gaston, known as the father of commission government in Houston, was a formidable figure to select as an opponent. A city official since 1902 and the last of the original four commissioners elected in 1905 remaining in office, Gaston reputedly knew "more about Houston's municipal finances than any other man living." Most recently, he had chaired the Houston delegation to Washington that had secured a $1.25 million federal appropriation for the ship channel. Nonetheless, Pastoriza perceived weaknesses in Gaston's standing. Invoking the old-fashioned democratic tradition of rotation in office, Pastoriza insinuated that certain commissioners had been in power long enough. As "the American people will not submit to a monarchy, neither will they have its first cousin—perpetual office holding." Thus, the time called for change. In the contest's last week, Pastoriza charged that Gaston could not state the amount of interest received on the city's bank balance for each month of the past six years. As commissioner, Pastoriza pledged to use a daily balance sheet to maintain such records. To maximize interest payments, he promised to have banks submit annual bids for the use of the city's money. Pastoriza regarded this merely as the brand of sound business practice he had followed in his print shop. He claimed that enough money would be gained by this scheme to pay his salary and that it represented "only one of the many plans which I have learned by travel and study, and which I have in mind, to make the people's taxes go further." On the eve of the primary, Pastoriza chaired a rally at the Single Tax Log Cabin in which he stated that Gaston had not yet answered the questions raised about interest on the city's deposits. Though "a certain party" had offered $100,000 for his withdrawal from the race, Pastoriza was in the contest to stay.²⁷

Significantly, no hint of the future Houston Plan of Taxation surfaced in the campaign. Pastoriza, fearful that his single tax identity might be politically damaging, consciously de-emphasized his more radical views. At one point, he argued that Mayor H. Baldwin Rice and Gaston themselves supported the single tax concept, since they had tried to cut taxes on buildings and to exempt personal property. Furthermore, since the state constitution would prohibit the single tax, Pastoriza could not install it even if he so desired. Finally, the candidate cited the testimony of a man who "thought J. J. Pastoriza was a crank but was going to vote for him anyway because he was a good business man."²²

On February 25, Pastoriza won a stunning victory in the Democratic primary. With 3587 votes, he finished second on the list of twelve commission candidates (the top four vote-getters were elected), making Gaston the only incumbent to suffer defeat. Houston newspapers duly noted this dramatic entrance into the political scene. The Chronicle, edited by Marcellus F. Fosler, labeled Pastoriza a man of advanced views and concluded that his election revealed a sizable bloc of voters "interested in progressive [if] not to say radical policies." But while the new commissioner had been for years an advocate of the single tax and municipal autonomy on tax questions, he was also "a hard-headed and successful business man." As previous vice-president of the Houston Manufacturers Association, he had worked for the town's industrial development. In any case, whatever his theories, he had not been elected on a single tax or home-rule platform. The more conservative Post acknowledged that Pastoriza "waged, single-handed, one of the most remarkable campaigns in the political history of the city." His numerous personal appearances and newspaper messages acquainted nearly every voter with his perspective. Though a disciple of Henry George, Pastoriza had declared his eagerness to work in harmony with other city officials.²³

During his first year in office, Pastoriza introduced the Somers System of Equalization to evaluate property for tax purposes. On May 1, 1911, the mayor and the city commissioners in their regular council meeting created a Committee on Taxation with J. J. Pastoriza as head. This body took responsibility for the assessment and collection of city taxes from the Board of Appraiser. Mayor Rice justified this reorganization as a means of providing taxpayers faster service in case of problems or complaints.²⁴

Pastoriza energetically confronted his new tasks. The need to raise assessments some $12 million to generate additional revenue for 1911 and the awareness that property valuations were grossly uneven gave the Tax Commissioner the chance to revamp the system of tax valuation. Pastoriza explained that he had met William A. Somers some fifteen years before while on a business trip to New York City. As a student of taxation, he became

²⁶Houston Chronicle, February 13, 15, 1911; Houston Post, February 14, 1911.
²⁷Houston Chronicle, February 18, 26, 27, 1911; Houston Post, February 15, 28, 1911.
²²Houston Chronicle, February 23, 1911.
²³Houston Chronicle, March 1, 1911; Houston Post, March 1, 2, 1911.
²⁴Progressive Houston 3 (May 1911), Houston City Book 1912, 42.
interested in Somers’s work and studied it over the course of several visits. Basically, Somers had devised a method for calculating the value of lots on a particular block by determining the price per front foot of a middle lot on each of the block’s four sides. In his new position, Pastoriza realized the worth of such a scientific manner of assessment for Houston. In 1911, he applied what he remembered of the system to the valuation of the business district. Property owners and city officials generally were pleased with the results. With that encouragement, Pastoriza journeyed to Denver for two weeks in the summer to work with city officials installing the Somers System there. Pastoriza made a favorable report to the city council upon his return. As a result, it adopted the Somers System for full use in Houston in 1912.14

Through a contract with the Manufacturers Appraisal Company of Cleveland, and with the cooperation of property owners, the Chamber of Commerce and the Houston Real Estate Exchange, Pastoriza overhauled city property assessments. The commissioner had the city mapped and divided into thirty-five districts. He then visited each district and determined the value of a one-hundred-foot-wide by one-hundred-foot-deep segment in the center of every block. In this way, each area was valued as uniformly as possible. As a result, the Somers method produced a $19 million rise in Houston’s property valuation between 1911 and 1912. From 1910, the total assessment leaped from $63.7 million to $86.2 million, an increase of more than 50%. Pastoriza and his supporters explained that this reflected the previous tendency to undervalue the holdings of Houston’s wealthier citizens. Pastoriza recalled finding one lot valued at $1600 that he raised to $20,000 with no objection from the owner. Henry F. Ring, a single taxpayer and a former city attorney, cited numerous revised assessments of land exclusive of improvements that were 100% to 200% higher. Other assessments, particularly those of small homeowners, decreased in value as previous errors were adjusted.15

The Somers System in its first year let the city reduce the tax rate from $1.70 to $1.50 per $100 of property and still raise $100,000 more in ad valorem revenue (Houston’s total income for 1912 was slightly less than $2.2 million). In his annual report, Mayor Rice termed the Somers method “a very efficient system, just and equitable to all.” Pastoriza advised a tax official in

Bridgeport, Connecticut, that “no city will make a mistake by adopting the Somers System, if those who put it in operation have a real desire to deal out justice to the property owners.” Pastoriza’s laudable achievements in this area were a portent of reforms to come.16

The assessment equalizations furnished by the Somers System now enabled Pastoriza to institute the Houston Plan of Taxation. Pastoriza noted that the city council adopted the Houston Plan at the beginning of 1912. In a leaflet distributed to Houston taxpayers in July 1912, he detailed its key features. In the most important provision, the city would assess land for tax purposes at 70% of its full value, and improvements upon land at a 25% rate. Houston would exempt from taxation forms of personal property such as bank deposits, stocks, bonds, mortgages, and household goods. Pastoriza’s plan taxed one other form of personal property, merchants’ inventories, at 25% of value.17 For the first time, the franchise of public service corporations would be assessed at their fair value (the 70% figure that applied to unimproved land). Between 1911 and 1912, the application of the Somers System raised the assessment of the seventeen public service corporations concerned—Houston Lighting and Power, Houston Electric Street Railway Company, Houston Gas Company, Western Union, et al—nearly a million dollars to $1,733,000. Pastoriza noted that this would bring the city about $278,000 additional revenue in 1912.18

Shortly after the introduction of this scheme, Pastoriza bragged of its accomplishments. The partial exemption of improvements and full exemption of personal property shifted the tax burden to land values. This had had a “magical effect” upon Houston. In the first six months of 1912, 219 more buildings were erected than in the same period in 1911. This activity represented a threefold increase in terms of value. Pastoriza concluded that

14Houston City Book 1912, 12-13; Houston City Book 1915, chart attached to the Tax Commissioner’s Report; Houston Chronicle, March 16, 1913.

15Before the advent of the Houston Plan, all these forms of property were supposed to be assessed for taxation at their full value. But since property values were so wildly unequal before the adoption of the Somers System, this was not really the practice. As Pastoriza recalled, some buildings previously were taxed at 10% of their value, others at practically their full value, and others escaped taxation altogether. The Somers System eliminated these discrepancies, so that even with the Houston Plan’s tax exemptions in place, the city’s total assessed property values markedly increased. For a detailed record of Houston tax collections from 1901 through 1916, see Houston City Book 1917, chart attached to the Tax Commissioner’s Report.

"there was more done to relieve industry from taxation in Houston, Texas, during 1912 than had been done in any other city in the United States up to date."28

Without question, Pastoriza viewed the Houston Plan of Taxation as a movement in the direction of Henry George’s single tax, especially in its separation, for tax purposes, of improvements from land values and its discriminatory treatment of the latter. The central problem this raises is how Pastoriza, could maintain popular support for such seemingly radical policies in a city with a rather conservative political tradition.29 Was the Houston Plan’s author a utopian ideologue who had stirred the reform imagination of the masses or a sophisticated urban promoter who actually operated within the traditional framework of Houston politics?

As a devoted follower of Henry George, Pastoriza naturally thought and spoke in highly idealistic and visionary terms. The single tax, as its name implied, represented a kind of panacea for the ills of industrial capitalism. Its advocates easily slipped into perfectionist rhetoric when discussing social and political concerns. Pastoriza revealed this inclination when recalling his earlier years in the local single tax movement, where “we have met... friends, hundreds of times... trying to study how to abolish poverty from the earth.” Pastoriza’s new tax system held the same grandiose promise, for “when the Houston Plan of Taxation is carried to its logical conclusion, people will begin to realize what the millennium upon earth means.”30 But beneath this layer of utopian verbiage, an immensely practical sensibility thrived. Pastoriza, it should be recalled, had triumphed in the hard world of commerce. His business record appealed to an electorate that desired entrepreneurial success and a community obsessed with economic expansion. His argument that the Houston Plan of Taxation would insure not only social justice, but also continued and accelerated growth, became the root source of its appeal.

Pastoriza’s entry into Houston politics coincided with one of the most rapid periods of development in the city’s history. Between 1910 and 1917, the population exploded from 78,800 to approximately 130,000.31 In early 1911, Harris County voters, on what was termed “the birthday of a Greater

Houston,” overwhelmingly approved a $1.25 million bond issue to match federal funding for the construction of a fifty-mile-long, twenty-five-foot-deep channel. In the following mayoral campaign, a local commentator described the city’s outlook: “Houston, you see, has got the itch to grow. Everybody’s bit with the notion of seeing a big city here.”32

Pastoriza fully shared these sentiments. His claims for the Houston Plan’s impact reflect this. Pastoriza argued that the partial exemption of improvements from taxation touched off a building spurt in 1912. By 1916, the Commissioner asserted, Houston possessed “more skyscrapers and big apartment houses than any city in the state.” As a result, rents dropped 20% and more enterprises and residents moved to the city. Pastoriza predicted continued progress in this area over the next few years. In addition, Pastoriza had “decided to make Houston the money center of Texas.” When he entered office, said the San Antonio Light, “an estimated $30 million in local banks, only $100,000 was assessed, and “much of this belonged to widows and orphans and idiots.” With the Houston Plan’s full exemption of money from taxation, bank deposits climbed by $7 million. Increased savings allowed a more liberal extension of credit and further fueled the city’s growth. Houstonians liked these developments, especially since the combined Somers System and Houston Plan valuations diminished taxes for five thousand of the city’s property owners. Pastoriza summed up the case for the Houston Plan: “The fewer restrictions, both as to taxation and regulation, which a city places upon business or products, the faster, greater, and wealthier will that city grow.”

Given this perspective, Pastoriza was not an anti-establishment ideologue, but the city’s loudest booster. His Houston Plan, “if not adopted by other municipalities, will make Houston the largest city in the South—land speculators never build a city.”33

The Houston Plan of Taxation attracted attention and commentary across Texas. Both supporters and opponents of Pastoriza’s policies spoke out. A San Antonio resident argued that single tax enemies who tried to whip up fears of property confiscation were defeated by events in Houston. Just as Bessemer revolutionized the steel industry, “Pastoriza bids fair to revolutionize taxation in Texas.” A San Antonio correspondent congratulated the Houston Post on its stance against single tax legislation at the state level and urged the paper to

28Houston Chronicle, August 11, 1912


30Houston Chronicle, April 18, 1917; Pastoriza, "The Houston Plan of Taxation," 195.

31Houston Chronicle, January 7, 1911; Robert V. Hennes, A Night of Violence: The Houston Riot of 1917 (Baton Rouge, 1976), 16.

32Houston Chronicle, January 8, 11, 1911; ibid., February 21, 1911.


34Pastoriza, "How Rents Have Been Reduced in Houston," 199.
keep up its effort until "this crazy single tax theory" was repudiated thoroughly.26 However, other Texas cities emulated Pastoriza’s actions. By early 1913, Galveston officials were working on installing the Somers System in their community. And by 1915, Galveston, Beaumont, Waco, San Antonio, and Corpus Christi had incorporated features of the Houston Plan by exempting to some extent improved and personal property from taxation.27

Pastoriza’s reputation spread beyond his home state, as the single tax press trumpeted his success. A Chicago periodical listed his achievements and hoped that big business opposition to the Somers System and the Houston Plan would show small property owners their true interests. The Joseph Fels Fund Bulletin wrote that despite legal and constitutional impediments, "Pastoriza is converting Texas to the single tax." Having single taxpayers like Pastoriza in local offices could provide examples for the national movement as well as distract tax reform opponents at the state level. In short, Houston was no longer "astorized" like New York City under the Astor family monopolists, but "pastorized." Where pasteurized milk benefited individual health, "the use of a pasteurized tax system preserves the health of the body politic."28

Albert Jay Nock penned one of the liveliest defenses of the Tax Commissioner, whose biographical sketch in the American Magazine, alleged that Pastoriza became a single taxpayer after a red estate venture brought money that he felt he had not earned: "All his one-track Texas mind could think of was that since he had absorbed public property as a private take-off... he was a social parasite and thief." Pastoriza successfully invested in land again and again to expose this injustice to the people. As a tax official, Pastoriza bowed to the popular will in ignoring the constitutional requirement to value all property uniformly. In this, he followed Emerson’s maxim that "a good man must not obey the law too strictly." But while Houston’s "beauty and chivalry" had anticipated the worst, Pastoriza had produced the largest assessment in the state and lowered the tax rate at the same time. As a result, "everybody who used to sneer at Pastoriza now swears by him."29

The 1913 Democratic primary provided a further gauge of Pastoriza’s popularity. The mayoral contest between attorney Ben Campbell and proprietor Milt Geiselman dominated news coverage. Campbell promised a business administration and a departure from the "nonprogressive tut" of the previous regime. Mayor Rice vigorously supported Geiselman as his successor. Pastoriza divorced himself from the current government, declining to run on the Geiselman slate with his three commissioner colleagues. While Campbell neglected to name an official ticket, Pastoriza was one of five commissioner candidates who met his approval. Pastoriza based his reelection appeal squarely upon the Houston Plan of Taxation. He chided individuals who now complained that the program violated the state constitution, Houston had never practiced uniform taxation. The Houston Plan therefore, was no more unconstitutional than the previous system, but considerably more just. In addition, the Somers System insured that land was assessed according to value and not its ownership. Pastoriza wished the voters to judge him on this record. In short, "if you like the plan vote for me; if you don’t, vote against me."30

On what was headlined a "Field Day for Progressives," Campbell beat Geiselman decisively. Pastoriza led the ball of fourteen commission candidates with 4900 votes, 1200 more than the nearest competitor. The Tax Commissioner saw his victory as part of the municipal reform wave of recent years. He believed Houston in the vanguard of this movement in the Southwest. Certainly, the electorate had endorsed the Houston Plan of Taxation since his ads were clearly asked for his return to office on no other basis. Campbell rewarded Pastoriza by appointing him Mayor Pro Tem at the outset of his administration.31

In 1914, a group called the Harris County Taxpayers Association organized to oppose the Houston Plan. Its elite members, who argued that Pastoriza’s land value taxation harshly discriminated against their interests, were some of the most important property owners and businessmen in the city. By January 1915, the Taxpayers Association announced that it would file suit against the City of Houston to have the Houston Plan declared illegal on constitutional grounds. The plaintiffs in this action were Joseph W. Baker and Joseph F. Meyer (executors of the estate of Rebecca Baker), Jules J. Sertzug, Sr., Harry F. Cohen, Samuel Rosenberg, and M. Pierce Geiselman. On January 11, these individuals petitioned the mayor and city council for redress in the matter of

26 Houston Chronicle, February 23, 1913, Houston Post, March 7, 1913.
30 Houston Chronicle, February 16, 1913, Ibid., March 5, 6, 1913; Houston Post, March 6, 1913.
31 Houston Chronicle, March 8, 1913, Houston Press, April 22, 1913.
tax valuations. Their written appeal quoted Article 8, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution: "Taxation shall be equal and uniform, and... all property, whether owned by natural persons or corporations, shall be taxed in proportion to its value." Except for certain enumerated categories of property such as schools, churches, and public burial grounds, the Constitution stipulated that "all laws exempting property from taxation shall be null and void." This was the kernel of the plaintiffs' case. The Houston Plan, in its full exemption of personal property and partial exemption of improved property, violated these provisions.

Several of the plaintiffs were prominent business figures. Joseph F. Meyer headed the Joseph F. Meyer Company, a large wholesale concern dealing in iron, steel, and heavy hardware. For thirty years, he was a vice-president of the Houston National Bank. The Chronicle, commenting on his prominent support for Ben Campbell in the mayoral campaign of 1913, described this "old warrior of Houston politics" as a leading investor in local buildings and real estate. M. Pierce Geiselman associated closely with Meyer. He was vice-president and treasurer of the Joseph F. Meyer Company, vice-president of the Houston National Exchange Bank, and, along with John Henry Kirby, was a vice-president of the American Trust Company. Harry F. Cohen owned the Texas Optical Company.

More crucial than their business interests was the property these individuals held. Pastoriza flatly identified them as "land speculators," and their own petition seemed to confirm this. In this document, the plaintiffs described themselves as "owners of large bodies of unimproved real estate" within the city limits. Moreover, the assessed values of this property "very much exceed the values of improvements on land and other taxable property possessed by said respective petitioners." With the Houston Plan assessing improvements at a rate 45% lower than that applied to unimproved property, more than $50 million in the city's improvement values escaped taxation. The revenues normally collected from this source were thus exacted in a discriminatory fashion from unimproved holdings. The resultant tax system was "peculiarly injurious to the petitioners" since "their principle taxable values within the city consist of land values without improvements." In certain cases, the property values concerned were immense. In a table attached to the plaintiffs' suit, the 1914 assessed value of the Baker estate was placed at $332,080, and that of Jules J. Settegast's property at $733,540. The holdings of Rosenberg, Cohen, and Geiselman were comparatively modest, being valued at $13,250, $24,880, and $40,354 respectively. Obviously, any scheme of uniform assessments on all classes of property would lower these tax bills appreciably.

Henry F. Ring's intervention in the controversy complicated the impending tax suit. Ring, a former city attorney and a single taxpayer, had in his official capacity twenty years earlier helped convince Southern Pacific Railroad to locate its general shops in Houston by promising to assess its property at a reduced rate. In this way, Ring had anticipated Pastoriza's policy of stimulating the city's growth by basing tax incentives on productivity. In early January 1915, Ring announced his intention to counteract any Harris County Taxpayers Association suit against the Houston Plan. Ring described himself as a property owner with interests similar to those of the plaintiffs. He currently owned fifty lots in Eastwood, all of them unimproved with the exception of his homestead. While ten years before, these lots were acquired for $50 each, they now sold for $600 to $750. In Ring's view, "this is simply legalized robbery." Owners like himself were not responsible for this increase in their wealth; the laboring and enterprising citizens of Houston had created it. Property holders should know that a growing community escalates the value of their holdings and should not support a tax system that would discourage economic expansion. "In ten years... at least half a million people will live within our city limits, and add enormously more wealth to the value of our vacant lots than the trifling amount of taxes which a very few will save by an appeal to the courts." The abolition of the Houston Plan and the enforcement of truly constitutional taxation would require the full assessment of bank deposits, loans, mortgages, and household possessions such as furniture, jewelry, and books. These sources alone would add more than $100 million to the assessment rolls (the total 1914 assessment was $109,597,280). This development would certainly discourage the city's continued growth. For these reasons, Ring was determined to oppose the "less than 1/10th of 1% of the citizens" wanting higher taxes on improvements and production. A court fight would be a splendid chance to show the people of Texas the need for a constitutional amendment to settle the question definitively.

The Harris County Taxpayers Association initially petitioned the city council for a change in the method of tax assessment on January 11, 1915. The

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1 Houston Chronicle, January 12, 1915; Plaintiffs' Original Petition in J. W. Baker vs. the City of Houston, No. 65,847, 61st State District Court.
2 Houston City Directory 1915, Houston Chronicle, March 6, 8, 1913.

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8 Petition to Mayor and City Council (Attached to Plaintiffs' Original Petition), J. W. Baker vs. City of Houston; financial chart attached to Plaintiffs' Original Petition.
9 Houston's New Taxation Plan, 55.
10 Houston Chronicle, January 3, 1915.
HOUeSTON'S PLAN OF TAXATION

Makes Possible the Erection of Large Buildings

These two lots cost me $200 in 1903. I will hold them until increased population has made them $2000. This profit I will get instead of the single tax terms on property by the community. This is a far-simile of a large sign on Mr. Pastora. A large sign. — This sign maintained by Joseph Fels, Philadelphians and London.

J. J. PASTORIZA
HENRY GEORGE
READ: "PROGRESS AND POVERTY."

This illustration of the Single Tax Log Cabin and its sign appeared in Houston's Municipal Journal of January 5, 1914, in conjunction with an article about the benefits of the Somers System.

Joseph Jay Pastoriza

Council routinely denied the Baker petition, clearing the way for a formal suit to be filed against the city. On January 18, William H. Wilson, attorney for the plaintiffs, initiated legal proceedings in the 61st State District Court of Judge John A. Read. In the case which became known as J. W. Baker vs. the City of Houston, the plaintiffs, in a nearly forty-page brief, denounced the discriminatory features of the Houston Plan of Taxation and requested an injunction or writ of mandamus to forbid its application in the 1915 assessment process. Judge Read scheduled the trial for February 22.27

The 1915 Democratic primary took place in this charged atmosphere. Pastoriza forthrightly cast his reelection effort as a quest for vindication from the voters. His candidacy announcement opened with the words, "I stand for the Houston Plan of Taxation." Pastoriza challenged any of the plaintiffs to run against him and let the people choose. The Tax Commissioner claimed support across class lines. While a few rich men were his enemies, many more affluent citizens approved his policies. Pastoriza regretted that he could not reduce tax rates for the poor, but retained their friendship nonetheless. Win or lose in the coming race, he would continue the struggle for "JUST TAXATION."28

Pastoriza attracted heated criticism in this campaign. Because of a change in the charter, the 1915 race was the first where commission candidates filed for specific positions. Thomas De Young, an ally of Pastoriza's bitterest enemies, opposed him for Tax Commissioner. In his announcement message, De Young attacked the Houston Plan. Unlike the incumbent, he would not place himself above the law, but would support constitutional taxation of property at equal rates. De Young perversely scored Pastoriza for printing Kipling's poem "If" in a newspaper ad. Why could not the Commissioner quote Longfellow or Whittier "instead of going across the water to get ideas?" If elected, De Young would halt the employment of experts by the city, especially those brought in from outside. In a stinging reference to Pastoriza's national connections, he declared, "I intend to devote my entire time to the duties of my office and will not make any lecture tours at the expense of the citizens of Houston."29

Mayor Campbell's rival, Judge Charles W. Bocock, joined in the anti-Pastoriza assault. The reason for his race was to expose "a taxation system which is rapidly destroying the prosperity and growth of the city." As mayor, Bocock would impose equal and uniform taxation as the Constitution

27Houston Chronicle, January 18, 1915; Ibid., February 20, 1915.
28Ibid., January 17, 1915.
29Ibid., February 14, 1915.
required. A law deemed wrong should be altered only with the consent of the public, not by "men with peculiar ideas." Bocock charged that the Houston Plan burdened small homeowners with its exemption of personal property. The irrepressible H.F. Ring answered the latter contention. He patiently explained that wherever improvements on a homestead exceeded in value the land itself, a reduced levy on improvements must lower the total tax. This was true for three-fourths of Houston's homes and dwellings. The fact that five thousand home owners had their taxes reduced during the first year of the Houston Plan illustrated this point. Ring concluded that Pastoriza's victory in the approaching primary "will prove my assertion that the business men and working men of Houston are overwhelmingly in its favor." 40

On February 16, Pastoriza won a smashing reelection as Tax Commissioner. Mayor Campbell and all four commissioners were returned to office. Pastoriza, "on whom the opposition sought to concentrate," beat De Young 5659 to 663. The Chronicle regarded this margin of triumph as astonishing given the degree of reform undertaken in the previous two years. Pastoriza naturally interpreted the outcome as an endorsement of the Houston Plan, considering the opposition's outspoken antagonism to it. Pastoriza believed that a more energetic campaign might have netted him a ten-to-one majority. The Commissioner placed only two newspaper ads in defense of the Houston Plan, employed no poll workers, printed no campaign cards, and spent only $288.70 in his reelection effort. 41

Pastoriza's euphoria proved short-lived, as two weeks later his property tax system was ruled illegal. On March 2, Judge Read, in what the Chronicle termed "a complete victory for the foes of the tax plan," declared the Houston Plan unconstitutional and promised to issue a writ of mandamus to compel city officials to comply with state law in subsequent tax collection. All forms of property must be assessed at the same proportion of value, though the Judge gave no instruction as to what percentage of value should be subject to ad valorem duties. The Post noted that this decision would affect not only Houston, but cities such as Galveston, San Antonio, Beaumont, and Corpus Christi which also used certain features of the Houston Plan. These communities would join the campaign to amend the Constitution in a way that would legitimize their systems. Pastoriza and other city officials announced their determination to appeal the decision, initially to the First Judicial District Court of Civil Appeals in Galveston and if necessary, to the Texas Supreme Court. 42

In the interim, Pastoriza responded in two ways to this challenge. First, he continued the agitation for an enabling constitutional amendment that predated Judge Read's order, and second, he and his fellow city officials proceeded to carry out the Judge's instructions in a literal fashion. In early February, Pastoriza traveled to Austin to appear before the House committee on taxation. There, he argued on behalf of the amendment introduced by Sam H. Dixon of Harris County that would allow cities to exempt certain property from taxation. Pastoriza believed most legislators favored the bill. The Post denounced the proposed amendment as the entering wedge for Henry George's single tax on land values, "toward which the present Houston system is a far step." It would permit millions of dollars of property to go untaxed and thus would be detrimental to the common people. The editorial continued that Houstonians did not want the single tax and that even if this were untrue, it would still be an unjust and unsound principle. 43

On February 20, 1915, Pastoriza delivered a long and eloquent address on "Home Rule Taxation for Cities" before the Texas House of Representatives. He began by stressing his record of commercial success. The diligence he had once practiced in business was now applied to securing for Texas a fair method of taxation. In this, Pastoriza enjoyed the support of 93% of Houston taxpayers as well as the "Lord God of Hosits, who stands for justice." He went on to describe the essence of the Houston Plan and how it had stimulated the growth of the city. Though the tax rate was lowered and many homeowners saw their tax bills diminished, city revenue was up $450,000 since its inception. Despite this progress, a "great howl went up" from those accustomed to setting the value of their property themselves. These "tax kickers" launched the Harris County Taxpayers Association, but "out of 15,000 taxpayers they could not get 100 to join them in their scheme to destroy the plan and retard the growth of Houston." They accused Pastoriza of being a single tax, a socialist, and an anarchist. To this suggestion, Houstonians responded, "if that mild-mannered, just man is an anarchist, so are we." Whatever the label assigned to it, the Houston Plan would continue to fuel the city's expansion. As for the current battle in the courts, Pastoriza intended to obey the resulting decision, but an adverse judgment clearly would require a constitutional amendment to correct it. For this reason, he urged the legislators to support municipal home rule in taxation. 44

40 Houston Chronicle, February 14, 1915; Houston Post, February 15, 16, 1915.
41 Houston Chronicle, February 17, 1915; Houston Post, February 18, 1915.
42 Houston Chronicle, March 2, 3, 1915; Houston Post, March 3, 1915.
43 Houston Chronicle, February 1, 1915; Houston Post, February 13, 1915.
44 Houston Chronicle, February 22, 1915.
Judge Read’s action abolishing the Houston Plan obviously quickened the debate over the proposed amendment. Its author, Representative Dixon, stated that he was pleased with the court decision since it would show the relevance of his measure. The Post again denounced the bill as a thinly-disguised single tax. It would encourage local option elections on tax matters which, due to low turnouts, would be dominated by crusading elements. In addition, Henry George’s principles applied on a statewide level would ruin farmers by placing the tax burden squarely on their lands. The editorial concluded that “the amendment should be killed, and killed so dead that we will never hear from it again.” A week after the court decision, Pastoriza sent a telegram to Austin signed by sixty-two Houston businessmen urging passage of the home-rule amendment. Several days later, two delegations journeyed to the capital to lobby on this question. Mayor Campbell headed the group in favor of the measure and Joseph F. Meyer led the opposition.49

The Campbell administration, in the wake of Judge Read’s pronouncement on the Houston Plan, proceeded to carry out the court decision in an exact manner. Campbell announced that all varieties of property—unimproved lands, buildings, and personal possessions—would be assessed at 100% of value for taxation. As a consequence, “Some people will find that they will get more than they bargained for.” The mayor predicted that total assessment values would nearly double to $200 million, while a tax rate reduced to $1.35 would yield $2.7 million in revenue. Pastoriza echoed these sentiments, saying “every man will be fed salt out of the same spoon.” The Tax Department sent out letters to each taxpayer with blanks for the assessment of all forms of property. Pastoriza ruled that household furniture in excess of $250 would also be taxed. In the same period, Pastoriza sent a letter to the First National Bank requesting the amount of money he had or deposit on January 1, 1915, so that it could be listed for tax purposes. The Tax Commissioner challenged all members of the Taxpayers Association to follow his example in this regard. In his annual report, Pastoriza reviewed these developments and stated that Houston “is making an earnest effort to tax all forms of property according to the Constitution.” That this was obviously impractical was revealed by how little personal property was being assessed despite the city’s vigorous attempts to put this value on the tax rolls.46

Not surprisingly, the administration’s extreme response to the court order touched off a heated debate in the city. William H. Wilson, the plaintiffs’ attorney in the tax suit, attacked the notion that Judge Read had ordered the 100% assessments currently being imposed by city officials. The court expressed no interest in the percentage of valuation, but simply had decreed that whatever percentage applied be the same for all classes of property. Houstonians should understand, Wilson asserted, that the city’s tax authorities set the 100% valuation strictly at their own initiative.47

James Charlton, County Treasurer and President of the Houston Single Tax League, answered Wilson.48 Charlton argued that city officials were not to blame for the 100% valuations. The fault lay with the state legislature, for Article 7530 of the Revised Statutes required that “each separate parcel of real property shall be valued at its true and full value in money.” This instruction applied to personal property and money as well. The city charter required officials to adhere to state law in collecting the property tax. Since Wilson was “personally responsible, in a large measure, for the agitation in favor of following the law,” he should not criticize city authorities for the natural consequences of the judicial action he had demanded. The Chronicle regretted that the city was caught between two squabbling factions on the tax question. The paper questioned the sincerity of those who had fought the Houston Plan on behalf of constitutional taxation, but also acknowledged that Pastoriza’s prior assessment policies violated the organic law of the state. Furthermore, Houston Plan partisans were incorrect in attributing the city’s growth to its stimulus. If the Plan accounted for Houston’s expansion, what particular local tax systems could then explain the even faster development of Los Angeles, Seattle, Portland, or Birmingham?49

In the midst of this acrimony over the Houston Plan’s demise, a movement for conciliation and compromise gained force. This new spirit surfaced in a meeting in Mayor Campbell’s office on the night of March 13. Representatives from both groups which had lobbied in Austin on the proposed constitutional amendment participated in this conference. Pastoriza, Settegast, Meyer, Cohen, and others heard James Dawson call for harmony since chronic strife over the tax issue damaged the city’s image. Important, the group decided to let the Dixon resolution die in the current legislative session in order to foster

46Houston Chronicle, March 9, 1915.
47Charlton, well known for his single-tax activities and close friendship with Pastoriza, served as County Treasurer for thirty consecutive years until he died in July 1936. Just before his demise, the Chronicle had endorsed his reelection at age eighty-nine. Charlton’s daughter, Mame Settegast, who had married the son of Pastoriza’s arch foe, J. J. Settegast, Sr., served out his term in the County Treasurer’s office. Houston Chronicle, July 18, 20, 1936.
48Ibid., March 10, 1915.

*Houston Chronicle, March 3, 9, 12, 1915; Houston Post, March 5, 1915.
*Houston Chronicle, March 3, 4, 6, 1915; Houston City Bank 1915, 97.
accord on the property tax question.  

Even H. F. Ring was ready to offer what the Chronicle termed an "Easy Way out of [the] Tax Muddle." The former city attorney felt that if 100% valuations could be applied all over Texas, then the absurdity and injustice of taxes on bank deposits, credits, and the like would be clear and reform would surely follow. But in the present circumstances, Houston, by acting in isolation, simply was hurting itself. Ring now favored compromise with the tax suit plaintiffs for "we all do want Houston to prosper, and we are all practically agreed on every thing except the fixing of values on building improvements." If the judgment against the city could be set aside, city officials and taxpayers could tacitly agree to assess land values at roughly 70% and improvements at about 50%. These figures should not be rigidly fixed however, since that had been the cause of the previous injunction. City authorities could record any voluntary valuations of personal property but following tradition, would not make a thorough effort to add such wealth to the assessment rolls. Ring urged the combatants to "bury the hatchet... and work unitedly for Houston." A partial return to the old system would not satisfy the Constitution's literal requirements, but would halt the withdrawal of hundreds of thousands of dollars from local banks due to fears that it would be taxed.  

The final blow to the Houston Plan came on May 20, 1915, when the First Court of Civil Appeals upheld the lower court's ruling in the case of J. W. Baker vs. the City of Houston. With the constitutional amendment now withdrawn as well, Pastoriza had to alter his tax policy. The 1915 and 1916 assessments mirrored H. F. Ring's proposals in taxing land at 70% of value and improvements at 50%. Pastoriza explained that many owners refused the command to assess their buildings at 100% since no structure was worth more than one-half the cost of its construction. Due to citizen noncompliance with full valuations then, the Commissioner had to impose constitutional, that is, equal and uniform, taxation by adjusting all assessments on improved property to 50% of value. Houstonians also denied their possession of personal property to the extent that of $30 to $40 million in bank deposits, only $250,000 was reported for tax purposes. Pastoriza noted that, as a result, outraged honest citizens demanded full tax exemption for cash and notes. He was forced to heed the popular will, so that "by the action of a majority of the taxpayers of Houston there became a new 'Houston Plan of Taxation,' which 

was just as illegal as the former one." The revised Houston Plan resembled the original except that it doubled the rate of taxation on improved property from 25% to 50%. It definitely retreated from single tax doctrine by lightening the comparative tax burden on improved land, but still reflected Pastoriza's initial intent to reward productivity and discourage speculation. In this altered form then, the Houston Plan of Taxation survived J. J. Pastoriza's six-year tenure as Tax Commissioner of the city.  

When Ben Campbell declined to seek a third term, Pastoriza announced his candidacy for mayor in December 1916. The Tax Commissioner cited his years in office as his best qualification and promised to maintain the administration's sterling capacity for managing the city's business. Pastoriza did not mention the Houston Plan in his announcement statement and indeed, it never developed into a central issue in the campaign. The ensuing contest was one of the liveliest and most partisan in the city's history. Pastoriza, according to a supporter, had to overcome "three candidates... two big daily newspapers [the Post and the Chronicle], all the big public service corporations, all the big land owners and a huge slush fund." Nonetheless, in the Democratic primary on February 23, 1917, Pastoriza won a four-cornered race with 43.39% of the vote. What the Houston Post deemed "a clear-cut victory for the people" proved to be the final triumph of his astonishing political career.  

Mayor Pastoriza died of heart failure on July 9, 1917, some eighty-three days after assuming leadership of his city. A stunned community mourned and put him to rest. Marcellus Foster, Pastoriza's friend and sometime adversary, spoke for many Houstonians in a generous eulogy: "An idealist and dreamer, who lived, as do all such, in advance of his day and generation, has passed this way, and the world is better for his having lived."  

Pastoriza represented the best in Houston politics in the Progressive Era or

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Footnotes:

1 Houston Chronicle, March 14, 1915.
3 Houston Post, May 21, 1915.

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Footnotes:

1 Houston City Book 1916, 91-92.
2 Houston Chronicle, December 15, 1916; Houston Post, February 24, 1917. The Rebel, the Socialist weekly published in Hallettsville, rendered an interesting assessment of Pastoriza's victory. It viewed the outcome as "an indication to the Democratic party and reform within the capitalist system. While not a Socialist, Pastoriza was "the instrument" in the irreversible advance of the revolutionary cause. For the Socialist critique of Pastoriza and his single tax policies, see the Rebel, January 16, 23, 1915, and March 3, 1917.
3 Houston Chronicle, July 9, 10, 1917; Houston Post, July 9, 10, 1917.
Richard Allen: the Chequered Career of Houston’s First Black State Legislator

Merline Pitre

In the last three decades massive revision in Reconstruction history has drastically altered the traditional stereotyping of black leaders as being ignorant, penniless individuals, ascending straight from the cornfield to the legislative hall. While earlier revisionists have made a genuine effort to eradicate this stereotype, they have also tended to perpetuate yet another stereotype by portraying black leaders as unselfish, single-minded individuals dedicated only to improving the lot of freedpeople. Hopefully as revisionism becomes more balanced, historians will produce more nuanced accounts which avoid inaccurate generalizations. Indeed, such accounts have already begun to appear. During the Reconstruction and post-Reconstruction eras, Southern blacks and whites had to fashion a new modus operandi in their relations with one another to replace the rules and regulations of interracial contact associated with slavery. Richard Allen, Houston’s first black state legislator, was a complex man whose career spanned these equally complex periods.

Allen’s Early Political Goals and Accomplishments

Richard Allen entered Texas Republican politics almost from total

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